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Abstract 
 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) presents a new landscape for humanity. Both what we can 
do, and the impact of our ordinary actions is changed by the innovation of digital and 
intelligent technology. In this chapter we postulate how AI impacts contemporary 
societies on an individual and collective level. We begin by teasing apart the current 
actual impact of AI on society from the impact that our cultural narratives surrounding 
AI has. We then consider the evolutionary mechanisms that maintain a stable society 
such as heterogeneity, flexibility and cooperation. Taking AI as a prosthetic 
intelligence, we discuss how—for better and worse—it enhances our connectivity, 
coordination, equality, distribution of control and our ability to make predictions. We 
further give examples of how transparency of thoughts and behaviours influence call-
out culture and behavioural manipulation with consideration of group dynamics and 
tribalism. We next consider the efficacy and vulnerability of human trust, including the 
contexts in which blind trust in information is either adaptive or maladaptive in an age 
where the cost of information is decreasing. We then discuss trust in AI, and how we 
can calibrate trust as to avoid over-trust and mistrust adaptively, using transparency as 
a mechanism. We then explore the barriers for AI increasing accuracy in our perception 
by focusing on fake news. Finally, we look at the impact of information accuracy, and 
the battles of individuals against false beliefs. Where available, we use models drawn 
from scientific simulations to justify and clarify our predictions and analysis.        
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Artificial intelligence (AI) impacts our behaviour. Intelligence, whilst not in itself defining 
humanity, is one of our key characteristics, inextricably linked to everything from our implicit 
survival strategies to our explicit self-concepts. Intelligence is also integral to the social 
institutions on which contemporary existence depends. AI is a set of technologies that extend 
human intellectual capacities such as perception, action, categorisation and pattern recognition. 
Some systems, termed autonomous, may do all of these things at once without human 
intervention, though only after human or human-institutional inception. 
Determining the impact of AI is imperative for two reasons: for empowering us to adapt 
to and optimise our existence with AI; and for developing AI and AI policies which maximise 
benefit and minimise harm to our society. Due to the myriad definitions of AI, we begin by 
establishing what we mean by the term, at least in the scope of this chapter. Intelligence is the 
capacity to do the right thing at the right time; thus artificial intelligence refers to non-living 
artefacts that demonstrate such capacities (Bryson, 2019). By this definition, AI has been 
prevalent for decades, albeit less advanced than at present, and not so apparent to the public 
eye. Present awareness of AI has been magnified by two different recent outcomes: first the 
sudden prevalence of anthropomorphic capacities such as conversational-speech recognition 
and generation, or automobile driving; and second the use of AI technology as part of a global 
assault on democracies, and through them key institutions to maintaining peace under the 
present global order, such as the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).1 
We focus here on how behaviour is shaped by contemporary intelligent technology; first 
by our cultural understanding of AI, then by the technological reality of AI. Many of our drives 
and behaviours, such as tribalism, sex, and resource procurement, are sculpted by thousands of 
years of evolution in disparate environments (McDonald et al., 2012; Buss and Schmitt, 1993; 
Kramer and Ellison, 2010). Therefore, in this chapter we explore from an evolutionary 
perspective how AI – ubiquitous in the modern world – impacts both individual and collective 
human behaviour. We put emphasis on the predictions from several published models that 
explain how information transmission facilitates intelligence between intelligent agents. We 
consider how these theories predict changes to individual and collective behaviour as the 
information transmission is magnified or its quality improved. We then compare, at least 
qualitatively, these predicted alterations to present societal trends. We finish with 
recommendations for guiding AI development and interaction to maximise adaptation, 
progression and overall benefit to the individual and society. 
More specifically, in Section 2 we initially tease apart the current actual impact of AI on 
society from the impact that our cultural narratives surrounding AI have. We consider the 
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evolutionary mechanisms that maintain a stable society such as heterogeneity, flexibility and 
cooperation. Given that AI can constitute a prosthetic intelligence, we discuss the consequences 
of how it enhances our connectivity, coordination, equality, distribution of control and our 
ability to make predictions. We also give examples of how transparency of thoughts and 
behaviours may influence call-out culture, as well as behavioural manipulation with 
consideration of group dynamics and tribalism. In Section 3, we discuss how AI may exacerbate 
the societal problems created by inequality. We place focus on the vulnerability of human trust 
in Section 4. We consider the contexts in which blind trust in information is either adaptive or 
maladaptive in an age where the cost of information is decreasing. We then bring the focus 
back onto trust in AI, and how we can calibrate trust so as to avoid over-trust and mistrust 
adaptively, using transparency as a mechanism. Finally, in Section 5, we explore the barriers to 
AI increasing accuracy in our perception by focusing on fake news. We consider the impact of 
information accuracy and the battles of individuals against false beliefs. 
 
 
2 IMPACTS OF AI THUS FAR
 
The narratives within a culture can have as much impact on behaviour as at least some objective 
realities (Hammack, 2008). For this reason, we begin by examining the current narrative 
surrounding AI. According to Social Representation Theory (SRT), when we encounter a new 
or unknown phenomenon, we construct a representation of it based on collective narratives and 
interpersonal communication (Moscovici, 1981, 2001). It seems clear that public gaps in 
understanding AI are often filled by fear-mongering entertainment shows like Black Mirror, 
magazine articles on the feats of Alpha Go, and propaganda from businesses (Elish and 
Boyd, 2018). Indeed, media exposure to science fiction has been found to predict fear of AI 
above and beyond demographic variables (Liang and Lee, 2017). 
Problematically, such representations assume AI with capacities far beyond the current 
feasibility – and in many cases, beyond the computationally tractable – instilling awe and 
fear (Bryson and Kime, 2011). An investigation of narratives surrounding the impact of AI 
revealed that the most common visions elicited anxiety (Cave et al., 2019). One such vision 
was that by becoming over-reliant on AI and machines, we will replace the need for humans in 
jobs, relationships and socialising. Emotional arousal increases the efficacy of information 
spread (Berger, 2011); this mechanism is posited to have evolved to transmit fitness-relevant 
information; i.e. information relevant to survival which can help organisms avoid dangers 
(Nairne et al., 2009) or direct resources within a population (Teste et al., 2009). Yet the adaptive 
benefits of this in contemporary cultures are questionable, now that the mechanism is known 
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and manipulable. These narratives may distract from or obscure the real problems and utility of 
AI, resulting in sub-optimal allocation of energy and resources (Bryson and Kime, 2011; Elish 
and Boyd, 2018). In the next few sections, we discuss the mixture of benefits and potential 
problems we face with AI. 
 
2.1 Flexibility, Cooperation, Coordination, Perception: 
Humanity’s Survival Mechanisms
 
AI does present a new landscape for humanity – yet, despite popular rhetoric, this does 
not necessarily pose an existential threat (Gent, 2015; Müller and Bostrom, 2016). Throughout 
our evolutionary history, humans have succeeded in adapting to changing environments 
(Gilligan, 2007; Richerson et al., 2005). Machines, in contrast, are typically fragile and short 
lived. As such, dangerous machines or technology are unlikely to be allowed to persist in their 
damaging behaviour long enough to destroy humanity as a whole, although arguably 
technologically mediated impacts such as climate change or hate crimes may already be costing 
lives. Cooperation and flexibility by means of heterogeneity (diversity) are two mechanisms 
that enable adaptation, survival and progress in unstable, changing environments (Brown 
et al., 2011; Lahr, 2016; Smaldino et al., 2013). Here we discuss the impact of AI on human 
behaviour within the context of these two mechanisms. 
There are two core hypotheses as to the role our nervous systems evolved to fill: the 
sensory-motor view, to link senses to actions; and the action-shaping view, to coordinate the 
body’s micro acts into macro acts (Godfrey-Smith, 2017). These hypotheses are by no means 
exclusive of each other. Likewise, our development of AI, amongst other things, has greatly 
enhanced our abilities to sense, act and coordinate. Our society has become increasingly 
complex; we are connected world-wide, with perturbations in one part of our global system 
impacting many others. AI can be considered as our prosthetic nervous system, a tool we have 
developed to selectively mediate the strength of edges between each node. As an example, we 
can deploy hardy robots to explore subterranean and underwater environments inaccessible to 
humans, acting and perceiving on our behalf (Siles and Walker, 2009), growing new edges of 
our agency. Machine learning (ML), the ability to learn to perceive and categorise patterns 
based on input data, also constitutes a prosthetic perception. With adequate computational 
resources, ML for example allows us to search across larger ranges of data than a human might 
otherwise be able to internalise, and to consider more candidate patterns. Enhanced perception, 
assuming accuracy, means a species has more knowledge with which to react better to events 
in its environment. This constitutes an increase in human collective intelligence (Eagle and 
Pentland, 2003). 
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2.2 AI Increases Connectivity Which Facilitates Coordination 
but Also Transparency
 
An enhanced capacity for coordination also results from the increased connectivity that AI and 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) more generally facilitate. These 
technologies afford communication and coordination on a scale that human societies have never 
encountered before. This can be expected to have – and be having – myriad impacts on 
collective and individual behaviour, not all of which we have yet recognised (Bryson, 2015). 
Through increasing the number of individuals we can connect with, and decreasing temporal 
and spatial constraints on doing so, AI creates a capacity for highly agile cooperation. 
Cooperation and group-level investment as a whole is known to increase with capacity to 
communicate, because this capacity allows for the increased probability of discovering 
mutually beneficial equilibria (Roughgarden et al., 2006). This cooperation may occur at 
historically large scales, but also at small scales, and with higher frequency of change in 
aggregation and direction. Social media platforms, for example, have facilitated mass 
organisation of not only protests but also disaster recovery which may not otherwise have been 
feasible (Gerbaudo, 2018; Starbird and Palen, 2011; Vieweg et al., 2010). Additionally, 
increased access to knowledge enables us to predict threats or more quickly become aware of 
disasters (Chavan and Khot, 2013). 
Connectivity also has the effect of increasing behaviour transparency. Social media 
pages reveal the ‘likes’, ‘dislikes’ and actions of a population. Problematically within this 
context, humans are often driven to take on characteristics of a group, and strive to behave 
according to group norms (Terry and Hogg, 1996), which may have a homogenising or 
polarising effect, particularly during periods when competition and identity politics are steep 
(McCarty et al., 2016). Before we were so connected via the digital world, the group norms we 
had access to were of far smaller scale. This facilitated diversity – a global heterogeneity of 
group norms. Now, our access to the large scale, combined with behaviour transparency, is 
widely believed to homogenise behaviours and preferences (Morris, 2002). This is true even 
without taking into account potential conformity induced by physical, political, or economic 
threats for unacceptable behaviour, which we discuss further below. However, the data created 
by our digital activity is also made transparent for use by the political and business, as well as 
the social, realms. This can have positive impacts as well, if it is used to, for example, provide 
better public services or ensure greater customer satisfaction. 
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2.3 AI Facilitates Behaviour Prediction and Manipulation
 
Ordinary collectives such as companies use algorithms on big data sets to predict our behaviour 
with increasing accuracy (Zuboff, 2015). This seems qualitatively different to our already adept 
prediction capacities: to navigate our social world, we use mental models of people to infer and 
predict the beliefs, actions and intentions of others (Bradford et al., 2015). This ability, 
alongside language (Smith, 2010), has been critical for facilitating our species’ large-scale 
social cooperation. However, AI has enhanced our ability to predict the individual and 
collective beyond past capabilities. This can aid us to better allocate our time and resources. 
For example, by anticipating that the number of people about to use a road is beyond capacity, 
a navigation app may direct a proportion of people along a different route, altering their 
behaviour advantageously for the collective. At an individual level, the ‘optimal’ level of sleep 
(Hao et al., 2013), exercise (Spring et al., 2013), socialising and nutrition (Franco et al., 2016) 
can be predicted then recommended. Unfortunately, businesses looking to maximise profits 
will tailor their product – or just monetising efforts related to their product – to the individual 
based on predictions. This can be with an incentive to reshape behaviour to make it even more 
easily predictable, or otherwise less expensive for the company, for example when insurance 
companies demand digital access to evidence of healthy living (Raber et al., 2019). This, whilst 
not explicitly detrimental to cooperation, may increase homogeneity and therefore reduce group 
advantages and societal robustness (Fisher, 1930; Shi et al., 2019). It also speaks to an 
additional issue with behaviour transparency: capacity for behavioural control. 
Both the aforementioned examples of collective and individual behaviour tweaking and 
recommendations indicate a shift in autonomy; it seems AI may be increasing collective agency 
but decreasing opportunity and drive for individual decision-making. In fact, a survey of 970 
respondents revealed that a core concern surrounding AI technologies is the loss of human 
agency and input into decisions (Anderson et al., 2018). At one level, behavioural control may 
or may not shift to autonomous artificial agents, but either way at a higher level it shifts to the 
individuals or organisations who can monitor data and deploy any such agents. This enables 
execution of potentially regressive social policing, albeit some well-intentioned. Take for 
example, the rise of helicopter parenting (Lee et al., 2014), or AI-powered predictive policing 
systems (Meijer and Wessels, 2019). We do not claim such behaviour manipulation is unique 
to AI. There are varying views on whether manipulation techniques (not all of which necessarily 
use AI) are ethical, when used for example to promote health (Behavioural Insights Team, 
2010) or reduce debt (Behavioural Insights Team, 2012). We see the sense in policies (such 
as that of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 2019) recommending 
that behaviour manipulation may be ethical in contexts where all the following hold: it can be 
7 
beneficial for the individual and/or society, transparency is provided as to the nature of the 
manipulation, and the subject or a responsible adult representative of the subject has consented. 
This (arguably, cf. Simkulet, 2019) leaves the individual some control over the decision, at least 
at a higher level. For example, clinicians, especially under cognitive load, can demonstrate bias 
towards ethnic-minority patients, resulting in sub-optimal interaction, diagnosis and treatment 
(Stone and Moskowitz, 2011). Evidence suggests that two tasks – perspective taking or 
categorising oneself to be in a shared group with the ethnic minority – can reduce bias. In this 
scenario, consented behavioural manipulation could involve an app-based intervention, where 
the clinician chooses to engage with a bias-reduction task prior to seeing the patient. 
This same public or semi-private – and sometimes implicit – communication of 
preferences can be used deliberately to determine the personality types of individuals, and also 
their voting inclinations (Gelman et al., 2016; Kosinski et al., 2013; Wu et al., 2015). Such 
information has obvious applications for those interested in the outcomes of elections, which 
have apparently been deployed with some success. Such techniques were reportedly originally 
designed and deployed to break up terrorist networks in conflict regions in the Middle East. 
The technique consists of identifying like-minded individuals with minority opinions that are 
available locally or otherwise convenient to those doing the aggregating, then introducing these 
individuals to each other and encouraging their political participation (Piette, 2018). AI-
powered search can produce the ‘coincidence’ of good numbers of like-minded individuals in 
one place, convincing them all that their position is secretly in the majority – a secret being kept 
by the political status quo which must therefore be attacked. Relatively simple AI allows the 
identification and coordination of such target individuals; ICT allows the application of such 
power from a distance and across borders. Without laws and technological enforcement for 
transparency, such manipulation may be done invisibly. 
 
2.4 AI as Prosthetic Memory
 
In the past, humans strove to both remember and to be remembered, yet the time and monetary 
cost of data retention were barriers to doing so. Now, however, these costs have reduced to the 
point where we no longer need to be picky about the quality of what we select to retain. This 
has its advantages and disadvantages. Biological brains forget (Kraemer and Golding, 1997). 
In humans, such a lack of pruning memories, inability to forget, or information overload can 
result in deficits in executive functioning, and an inability to escape past autobiographical 
memories (Parker et al., 2006). Using AI-driven techniques, even with surplus data, we can still 
successfully store, reorganise, classify and retrieve the relevant information we require from 
large data stores. However, this prosthetic memory of digital expression of opinions and beliefs 
– whether political, religious or otherwise – combined with increased connectivity has resulted 
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in, amongst other things, a resurgence of call-out culture and public shaming (Hess and 
Waller, 2014; Tucker, 2018; Webb et al., 2016). 
The urge to normalise groups by exiling or denouncing the credibility of individuals who 
diverge is a facet of tribalism prevalent throughout our history (Bechtel, 1991; Burns, 2003). 
Novel though with the AI landscape is the relative immortality of digital memory. The social 
costs (and benefits) to acting or thinking in diverging ways have increased; it is hard to be 
forgotten. Thus again, we are homogenised by our evolutionary urge to remain in the safety of 
the tribe. Mayer-Schönberger (2007) advocates finding an equilibrium: by giving data an expiry 
date after which it will automatically be deleted, we can maximise the benefits of a precise 
prosthetic memory, whilst preserving the right to be forgotten. However, such arbitrary 
truncation would also be an end to history, unless history were still retained in non-digital 
format. Even if exceptions were made for those considered public individuals, as is now the 
case for certain privacy laws, this could have an unintended effect of reducing social mobility, 
as those in situations of prominence, privileged with being knowable, would be more likely to 
garner further attention and opportunity. 
Historical data also has applications ranging from the social sciences to monitoring the 
impacts of government policies. In an era where behaviour modification might be practised by 
subterfuge, accurate historical data may be the only way to detect malicious actors working 
subtly over time. The rights to freedom of opinion and thought are enshrined in the Declaration 
on Human Rights (United Nations General Assembly, 1948), but without an option of 
perceivable expression such rights may be of limited value. There is substantial research being 
conducted in anonymisation, including for data extraction and analysis – whether this proves 
mathematically tractable remains to be seen. Uncompromised cybersecurity of not only data 
storage but transmission would also be necessary for any digital records to have even a hope of 
remaining private. 
The claim that homogenisation is a side effect of AI may seem demonstrably false given 
the increase in identity politics and political polarisation. Coincidence is not necessarily causal, 
and even if there is a causal link, it may be difficult to untangle. Polarisation is known to be 
correlated with wealth inequality, and to have been so since before the advent of ICT and AI. 
Whether AI is presently contributing to inequality will be considered in the next section. But 
with respect to homogenisation, it is worth saying that both processes may well occur at the 
same time – rather than a plethora of perspectives, we may find strong forces towards 
conformity with one of a small number of tribes. Again, this is the opposite of what was 
anticipated with access to the Internet and cheap self-publication, and there is also evidence of 
societal fragmentation (Pentland, 2015). 
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3 AI AND INEQUALITY
 
Whether or not we become more homogenous in our beliefs and opinions,  inequality in access 
to resources and quality of life is increasing. We discuss here what is known about how 
inequality is driven, and consider the impact of AI and the consequences for the collective. 
First, it should be observed that globally inequality has been falling, an effect driven 
primarily by the very poorest. The World Bank reports more than a third of humanity moving 
out of extreme poverty since 1980 (Roser and Ortiz-Ospina, 2017), a shift that has been 
facilitated by ICT including AI, as populations have had more access to useful information such 
as weather predictions, fair prices and how to obtain government support. Further, efforts to 
communicate political and economic situations, and means to coordinate protest, are leading at 
least some governments in rich areas such as the member states of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to adopt policies that have been 
demonstrated to reduce inequality within populations by increasing wealth distribution. 
Nevertheless, an individual’s access to public goods such as schools, physical security, 
utilities and health depends to a large degree on their geographic identity. Access to ICT and 
AI is no exception (Robinson et al., 2015; Sujarwoto and Tampubolon, 2016), although it is 
also influenced by other factors such as age. As we globally become more dependent on such 
tools, the populations without access are exposed to higher risks of inequality. By moving 
towards equality of access to these technologies, individuals may have improved job 
opportunities and information in regard to the socioeconomic, political and cultural context in 
which they live. 
The increase in inequality may result in reduced social cohesion as it seems to be 
correlated to reductions in social mobility and increases in political polarisation (McCarty 
et al., 2016). ICT and AI may also reduce the sort of localised social cohesion that is critical to 
many forms of well-being and political engagement, by diverting social attention to others with 
shared interests in topics that are not geographically centred. In this, it continues and expands 
on trends of mass media known since the beginning of the information age with, for example, 
the advent of national newspapers (Perlman and Sprick Schuster, 2016). For a substantial 
fraction of our society, the time we spend engaging with others as real, physical equals is 
replaced with ever-more-engaging digital entertainment. Research shows that whilst some US 
teens felt digital technologies connected them with others, others felt it resulted in a lack of in-
person contact in their lives (Anderson and Jiang, 2018). The interaction that would once have 
taken place in person is now conducted through technology. 
There is a danger that inequality produces an elite who no longer identify with the 
majority of individuals (Atkinson, 2015). This can be the effect not only of lack of social 
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mobility and understanding, but even of simple spatial segregation (Cassiers and Kesteloot, 
2012). As discussed earlier, digital social media provides a ready platform for disinformation, 
including caricaturised and exaggerated distortions of others. An elite may also falsely assume 
that it can consolidate power by extracting wealth from its own neighbours and nearest 
contenders. However, inequality breeds instability as the whims of small coalitions or even 
individual actors are unpredictable (Scheidel, 2017). When greater collective action is required, 
solutions become more predictable and stable, ironically better ensuring the maintenance of 
rank order at the higher end of society. Power over a collective is not only an animal thrill, it is 
also a mechanism of security because it ensures more individuals are invested in a mutually 
beneficial outcome (Terkel, 1974). Trust is a factor in individuals collectively investing in 
mutually beneficial outcomes, yet not only does inequality breed distrust (Barone and 
Mocetti, 2016) but, even when trust is held, it is vulnerable to exploitation and damage to the 
individual. 
Again, there is no clear evidence to date, but rather active investigation, as to whether 
and in what ways AI may be affecting inequality. It seems evident that any technology that 
reduces the cost of distance will also facilitate inequality through no particular malfeasance but 
simply by allowing excellent businesses to dominate larger territories. In the case of some 
technologies now such as finance, media, pharmaceutical, aerospace, and of course digital, this 
is approaching the limit case of single corporations dominating markets globally. This same 
phenomenon may explain the similar surge in developed-world inequality witnessed in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries (Atkinson, 2015; Bryson, 2019). 
As mentioned in Section 2, another concern is that AI may alter employment. Whilst the 
common concern is that ‘robots will take all the jobs’, this seems highly unlikely as ‘all the 
jobs’ is not defined. There is an infinite number of ways we can better each other’s lives. People 
tend to employ each other when the economy is good, though this may be seen as tautological. 
But the advent of intelligent technology has been associated with an increase in demand for 
both highly skilled and very low-skilled and low-waged work, with a declining demand and 
therefore wages for the intermediate workers (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). Acemoglu and 
Autor (2011) suggest that technology plays two roles in wages: in allowing all to be more 
productive, this somewhat increases the value of being highly skilled, but flattens any 
advantages of moderate skill as people become more exchangeable. Worryingly, recent decades 
seem to be dominated by the latter effect (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011). 
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4 THE VULNERABILITY OF HUMAN TRUST 
 
Subjective evaluations of trustworthiness are deeply tied to how humans navigate the world. 
The likelihood of a monetary transaction is largely dependent on the trust a buyer has in a seller 
(Kim et al., 2008; Ponte et al., 2015). Trust in politicians affects voter turnout (Grönlund and 
Setälä, 2007) and electoral results (Hetherington, 1999). When evaluating a person’s face on 
multiple dimensions, subjective trustworthiness is one of the most predictive measures for 
overall evaluation (Oosterhof and Todorov, 2008). Further, once trustworthiness is perceived, 
it is relatively robust, persistently affecting behaviour (Delgado et al., 2005). If AI alters our 
capacity or predisposition to trust other humans, it will clearly have a deep impact on society. 
4.1 Baseline Proclivities to Blindly Trust 
 
Using simple economic games, it has been shown that individuals will blindly trust a stranger 
even when it leaves them vulnerable (Berg et al., 1995). In a one-shot Trust Game (TG), an 
investor is given some monetary windfall and must decide whether to keep the windfall, or give 
some fraction to a trustee. The fraction offered by the investor is then multiplied by some factor 
(typically three) and the trustee can then offer a fraction of the multiplied investment back to 
the investor. Human investors tend to blindly trust their partner by offering non-zero 
investments, even though it is in the trustee’s best interest to return nothing to the investor. 
Whilst trust is moderated by several factors, including framing effects (Burnham et al., 2000), 
geography (Johnson and Mislin, 2011), gender (Buchan et al., 2008), risk preferences 
(Fehr, 2009) and whether participants are selected from a student population (Johnson and 
Mislin, 2011), individuals consistently tend to blindly trust, investing some of their windfall 
(Johnson and Mislin, 2011). 
Significant research has sought to understand how blindly trusting others might be 
ecologically rational. This proclivity to trust has been explained as adaptive in relatively small 
populations where individuals have reputation cues of their partners (Boero et al., 2009; 
Masuda and Nakamura, 2012) or if the chance of knowing a partner’s strategy exceeds some 
threshold (Manapat and Rand, 2012; Manapat et al., 2013; McNamara et al., 2009; Rauwolf 
and Bryson, 2018). The common theme is that blindly trusting another can be adaptive if 
someone, somewhere, has a chance of having information about a player, including indirectly 
(e.g. if a population is known to share trust-related characteristics by some sort of contagion 
effect or enforcement). Interestingly, on the other hand, individuals will not trust others when 
they know the others are likely to return (reciprocate) an unfair amount in the TG, even if that 
amount would still make trusting them beneficial. 
12 
 
4.2 When Blind Trust Is Valuable 
 
We have previously contributed work demonstrating a generally advantageous but unstable 
evolutionary dynamic that typically establishes trust. This demonstration was in the context of 
simulations with computational agents playing one-shot TGs with each other. Agents were 
given several potential partners for playing each game, and chose which agent to play, if any. 
As in the natural world, the investing agent knew the reputation for historic pay-off of some 
partners, but did not know the pay-off of others – information was partially occluded. Each 
actor learned three things socially from the strongest players: the levels of trustworthiness in 
unknown players, the demanded level of reciprocation for known players, and their own 
reciprocation rate. Rauwolf and Bryson (2018) demonstrate that this simple dynamic is 
sufficient to generate trust. When the known pay-offs of partners are sufficiently low, it can be 
in an agent’s interest to blindly select a partner whose history is unknown, provided that the 
population has evolved high enough levels of trust, which tends to coevolve with high levels of 
reciprocation, and of course assuming sufficient extra benefit from mutual development of the 
public good. In these cases, blind trust can be more valuable to the agent than walking away 
with their monetary windfall, trusting no one. On the other hand, trust will not evolve if the 
reciprocation rate of many players is known, because it becomes better to stick with the best-
known available return rather than to take a chance with the unknown. 
The insight from this work is that a willingness to blindly trust others increases 
competition between others, lowering prices by increasing the reciprocation rate. It is well-
known that creating competition between sellers lowers prices. But, by being willing to trust 
those whose information is unknown, the pressure of competition is increased. Not only do 
sellers need to compete with other sellers whose information is known, they now need to 
compete with those whose information is unknown. This tends to lower the market price even 
further. This is related to work on outside options (André and Baumard, 2011). The value of a 
sale is contingent upon the other options of a prospective buyer. If an individual is willing to 
go elsewhere, even by blindly trusting a stranger, then the market is forced to adjust and the 
buyer’s life is improved. 
 
4.3 Information Cost Reduces Benefits of Trust 
 
Importantly, whilst the adaptive models of trust require that some information is available, trust 
fails if information is fully transparent (Manapat et al., 2013; Rauwolf and Bryson, 2018). By 
definition, the act of trusting another requires some uncertainty in the outcome 
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(Yamagishi, 2011). If information is fully transparent, then there is no need to trust another; 
rather, each individual can make an informed decision. The consequence is that there is no 
selective pressure to evolve or learn the strategies and beliefs associated with the riskier 
behaviour, but these are what bind a local community together. 
We are currently living in an age where the cost of information is dramatically 
decreasing. As a result, the adaptive benefits of trust are becoming increasingly obsolete. This 
may be for the best – we may have a more predictable environment with even higher rewards 
for ‘good’ behaviour. However, we should also be concerned about this being another force for 
homogeneity, and further loss of individual capacity to deal creatively with localised crises. 
The institution of trust may be just a consequence of our inability to perfectly control our peers, 
but it may also serve an adaptive advantage by reducing our responsibility to do so. Society 
does not need to come up with plans to handle every contingency, because a desperate 
individual can always take advantage of the availability of trust without first seeking social 
approval of their plans. 
There are indications that in the near term moving from trust to full information is 
problematic in other ways. Because we will not just ‘shut off’ our historic psychological choice 
making, replacing trust with information may mean that extant prejudices become more rigidly 
a part of our behaviour. Not only is trust deeply tied to how individuals make decisions, 
subjective trust is often biased and founded on unhelpful signals. People find attractive 
individuals more trustworthy (Wilson and Eckel, 2006). Individuals will invest more if a profile 
picture has a smiling face (Scharlemann et al., 2001) or is visually perceived as more 
trustworthy (Bente et al., 2012). The trust individuals place in profile information is often 
incorrect (Toma, 2010). More generally, individuals perform close to chance when predicting 
deception (Bond and DePaulo, 2006). Ert et al. (2016) show that perceived trustworthiness of 
an Airbnb option correlates more with the profile photo than the quantified reputation score of 
that option. This was confirmed by Fagerstrøm et al. (2017), who found that facial expressions 
in a renter’s photo predicted likelihood to rent more than customer ratings. This demonstrates 
that the transparency of information is not necessarily sufficient to improve behaviour. 
Individuals must make decisions using that information before it offers an advantage. 
 
4.4 Calibrating Trust in AI 
 
There is considerable discussion these days about trust in AI and trustworthiness for AI. Our 
own work and that of many in the UK’s ethics community more generally has taken a different 
tack, emphasising that trust is an anthropocentric trait not truly useful for artefacts, where 
transparency and accountability are more desirable (Boden et al., 2011; Bryson and Theodorou, 
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2019). Improving transparency in AI reduces the need to trust AI. Yet it is possible that 
transparency does not affect the consumption of AI when the human consumer projects human-
like identity to intelligent technology (anthropomorphises). By doing so, the consumer exposes 
themselves to exploitation as their established biases concerning the likelihood of 
trustworthiness are even easier to exploit via designed artefacts than they are by unscrupulous 
individuals. For example, one might assume that a robot is unlikely to remember everything 
you say because a person or pet would not, but the robot may in fact not only recall but transmit 
its full memory – a full record of all interactions or even nearby events – storing these offsite 
in a corporate cloud. Although in theory the same digital and architected features of AI that 
make it more powerful as a manipulator should also make it easier to govern, presently (2019) 
manipulation is outstripping governance. 
Acceptance of AI can be increased in many ways, but given the vulnerability of the 
human trust system, care is needed to ensure trust is extended with consent, and is not exploited 
(IEEE, 2019). Whilst tapping into the vulnerabilities of how humanity perceives 
trustworthiness may be efficacious, it can also result in unwarranted trust. People are already 
found to perceive AI as more objective than human decision-makers, and in some cases to over-
rely on AI. For example, in a legal setting, people demonstrated a preference to follow a 
machine advisor’s decision despite a human advisor having judgement of higher accuracy 
(Logg et al., 2019). In our own research (Wilson and Theodorou, 2019), we have found that in 
virtual reality (VR), AI actors presented to the participants as human agents were perceived to 
be significantly less deterministic than those presented explicitly as robots, despite both being 
controlled by the same AI system. 
It seems that many of us attribute properties to AI that do not exist, at least where that AI 
reminds us of humans (Sparrow, 2019). Some evidence suggests that anthropomorphising 
robots increases interaction with them (Waytz et al., 2014) via increased trust resistance (de 
Visser et al., 2016) and mind attribution. There are uncertainties as to the impact of 
anthropomorphism when robots are more prevalent and ‘normalised’ in our society. As we 
grow familiar with robots in our day-to-day lives, our mental models of robots may become 
more accurate (Bryson and Kime, 2011). We may perceive with more clarity the distinctions 
between artificially embodied cognition and humans, or commercial products may be mandated 
to provide transparency. In these cases, the impact of anthropomorphism may be reduced. 
Alternatively, viewing robots as human-like may become normalised, and social robotics – 
believed to be human-like, despite their inhuman, designed capacities – an embedded aspect of 
our lives. 
We suggest that a safer and more long-term stable approach is to work to increase AI 
transparency whilst simultaneously helping individuals learn to make choices using empirical 
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information. As the information age reduces the need for trust, individuals need to be trained 
to operate in this information age, rather than reinforcing poor decision-making tendencies 
based on fallible and manipulable perceptions of trust. An example of increased AI 
transparency would be to have a QR code attached to each robot that when scanned gives 
information on the robot’s maker, purpose and capabilities. We have also been developing 
means for allowing users to see the current goals and strategies of a robot or other real-time 
interactive AI system (Rotsidis et al., 2019; Theodorou et al., 2017), and are presently 
experimenting to see whether this reduces the moral-hazard aspects of anthropomorphism. 
Whilst some may see viewing AI as human-like to be an example of a freedom of opinion or 
even association, we feel strongly that such opinions need to be informed where information is 
available, in order to avoid unknowing exploitation. Willing exploitation, like the manipulation 
of emotions that occurs during a motion picture or other work of fiction, is of course a perfectly 
acceptable part of life and entertainment. We only seek to avoid economic and political 
manipulation imposed on unknowing others. 
 
5 BARRIERS TO ACCURATE PERCEPTION AND 
DEVELOPMENTS 
 
Our earlier metaphor for AI as an extension of our nervous system posited that new AI tendrils 
enhance our ability to sense and perceive. Yet, problematically, the collective intelligence that 
could be garnered from this additional perception is hindered by two key barriers: the fact that 
data can be inaccurate and misleading, and our own inability to handle and interpret data. In 
this section we explore the origins, trajectory and impact of inaccurate information in human 
communication networks. We note our current inability to correctly deploy, infer and apply 
meaning from AI. We highlight current avenues for reducing these barriers in order to fully 
exploit our augmented collective intelligence. 
5.1 ‘Fake News’ 
 
Humans have long expressed a desire to record and share information: the first encyclopaedia 
was written in AD 77 (Gudger, 1924); libraries have been dated back 2,000 years earlier. The 
arrival of the telegraph and Morse Code in 1835 enabled instantaneous transmission of 
knowledge across great distances (Burns, 1988); now databases are ubiquitous. Historical 
records indicate sharing knowledge spurred many innovations (Bessen and Nuvolari, 2016), 
and on a day-to-day basis, enables individuals to make informed decisions and actions. 
Unfortunately, not all shared information is accurate. Disinformation and misinformation, 
which often fall under the misnomer ‘fake news’, are of rising public concern. Disinformation 
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implies intentional creation and sharing of manipulated or false information, whereas 
misinformation refers to inadvertent sharing (Lazer et al., 2018). 
Fake news is not new: since humans could speak, misinformation has spread via word of 
mouth. The spread increased and quickened with the arrival of newspapers and pamphlets, then 
with mass media such as television, finally exploding with the Internet and especially social 
media (Burkhardt, 2017). What is new is that, compared to past technological mediums, social 
media largely lacks filtering, editorial judgement and fact-checking (Allcott and 
Gentzkow, 2017). Further, the communication network is infiltrated by artificially intelligent 
bots, able to pass as or augment human users, which can be used to quickly deploy, share and 
spread information across networks (Machado and Konopacki, 2018). Such bots can be used to 
sway public opinion. In fact, disinformation affects stock prices (Carvalho et al., 2011), 
political opinions (Howard et al., 2018), and voting patterns (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017) at 
least transiently. Evidence shows that accurate stories take longer to spread but have more 
purchase once spread (Vosoughi et al., 2018). In previous work (Mitchell et al., 2016), we have 
demonstrated that even error-prone ‘gossip’ can be a better strategy than direct experiential 
learning for acquiring true and useful information. The speed of information transmission such 
as is provided by social media can in some circumstances outweigh the costs of incorrect 
information, particularly if disinformation can be identified and quickly combated 
(Panagiotopoulos et al., 2014). 
Nevertheless, in at least some contexts, our species seems often to communicate 
inaccurate rather than accurate information. An analysis of a data set of rumour cascades on 
Twitter revealed fake news was 70% more likely to be retweeted than the truth (Vosoughi 
et al., 2018). There are suggestions that fake news is more likely to be novel, and novelty 
captures human attention. Perhaps worryingly, the average American spends 23.6 hours online 
weekly (Cole et al., 2017), and 62% get their news online (Gottfried and Shearer, 2016). Whilst 
there is evidence that our trust of such news has decreased, exposure alone may have negative 
impacts. Exposure can prime thinking and conversational topics. When any news enters the 
conversational sphere, trust in the information increases (Hajli et al., 2014). We humans seem 
to have a disposition to trust information communicated by word of mouth (Atika 
et al., 2018; Huete-Alcocer, 2017). Conversations require resources such as time, cognition, 
and sometimes emotional investment. Actions occurring as consequence of conversations result 
in further deployment of resources. We know that, as a social species, we respond to such 
evidence of investment by others in our society (Zahavi, 1977). We posit that individual and 
collective resources may be consequently directed away from more accurate topics which are 
of perhaps more importance to our survival and flourishing. 
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5.2 The Impact of Information Accuracy 
 
In further work with simulations and formal analysis, we offered insight into the environments 
where humans may be vulnerable to utilising incorrect information (Rauwolf, 2016). 
Information requires both time and energy to gather. If information gathering comes at a non-
trivial cost, then we would expect individuals to truncate their information search after a period 
of time (Simon, 1956). However, given continual improvements in technology, the cost of 
information is falling; as a result we might expect individuals to be better informed. Importantly 
though, even if information is easily obtained, if the processing of that information is costly, 
limiting information can be advantageous (Rauwolf and Jones, 2019). 
Rauwolf et al. (2015) show that when the benefits of group dynamics conflict with the 
accuracy of beliefs, false beliefs can become the least-costly option. Across a variety of 
contexts, individuals tend to prioritise relationships with those who share similar values – a trait 
called value-homophily (McPherson et al., 2001). We have demonstrated that it is in precisely 
these contexts where individuals can be expected to use incorrect information (Rauwolf 
et al., 2015). When the social value or benefit provided by the group outweighs the private cost 
of possessing incorrect information, it is advantageous for the individual to maintain (or at least 
act on) their false beliefs. Given that the inaccuracy of political and religious beliefs provides 
virtually no personal cost (Caplan, 2001), but group agreement may provide social value 
through security, we would expect humanity would struggle to remove false beliefs, particularly 
in times of resource scarcity and conflict (Stewart et al., 2018). 
As the benefits conferred by AI and technology at large continue to improve and secure 
individual basic needs, individuals will likely pay a reduced private cost for possessing 
incorrect information across a broadening array of contexts. Regardless of the accuracy of an 
individual’s beliefs, the basic needs of most individuals are improving. As such, if individuals 
pay small personal costs for false beliefs, but garner large social benefits for group 
homogeneity, then we would expect an expanding and resilient battle against false beliefs. 
Nevertheless, what costs an individual little in isolation may cost a society a great deal 
due to aggregate responses, particularly in a democracy (Chote et al., 2016; Lewis, 2017). 
Whether or not we should strive for increased rate of information transmission in every case 
(see the discussions of trust and freedom of opinion above), we should almost certainly prefer 
accurate communication, though here, too, inaccuracy can sometimes lead to useful innovation. 
Disinformation is a global and long-running issue, and there are global initiatives to combat it. 
For example, Facebook flags potential news stories to be reviewed by third-party fact checkers; 
and through the messaging system WeChat in China, users can report fake news, which is then 
checked and flagged. Crucial new initiatives introduce critical literacy into the education 
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curriculum – training children to recognise and question information sources, particularly 
online (Vasu et al., 2018). Critical-thinking and fact-checking skills, as well as basic 
understanding of algorithm mechanics and their limitations, could enable the next generation 
to be better prepared to avoid such scenarios faced by us today (Guess et al., 2019). Fact-
checking can be as simple as conducting a Web search on a topic and its source. 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter we have discussed the impact of AI on contemporary societies. We took a 
perspective of understanding how the changing social and economic landscape induced by AI 
interacts with the human information-processing biases which evolved in very different 
environments. We consider a better understanding of these impacts imperative for our society 
going forward as we optimise our existence with AI, and for ensuring the AI and the regulations 
we design to govern its use both maximise benefit and minimise harm. We discussed the impact 
on both collective and individual human behaviour. Here we summarise the key foci of this 
chapter. First, the accuracy of narratives surrounding AI could critically impact optimal 
engagement with AI. Next, we compared AI to a prosthetic nervous system, which increases 
our perception and agency. AI also enhances our capacity to remember, coordinate, connect 
and communicate; this has many positive but also some negative outcomes. We considered the 
impact on freedom and diversity of opinion, political and economic impact, the mechanisms of 
information spread, and vulnerability of human trust and social coherence. The increased 
discoverability and predictability facilitated by AI requires serious consideration; there are 
myriad beneficial and harmful current applications of AI, and no doubt more of both to come. 
There are also of course many movements to ensure AI is beneficial to our society rather than 
harmful, though we did not take time to touch on those much here, we view such consideration 
and efforts as essential. Coordinating and enforcing such pro-social efforts has traditionally 
been called governance, and we hope this chapter may contribute to making sensible 
governance easier to both justify and employ constructively.  
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